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Agency Character and Congressional
Budget Cutting Behavior
JOH

WANAT

University of Kentucky
Interest in legislative-executive relations has recently found a focus in the
budgetary process. In the last ten years, Davis, Fenno, Horn , Kirst, Shar kansky , Wildavsky, and Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky all have written of
agency-Congressional relations in the budgeting arena. 1 To some degree they
all note that the legislature almost invariably appropriates less than the agency
requests . But the question of why Congress cuts a given agency's request as it
does has not been fully considered. Therefore it is the intent of this paper to
describe patterns in Congressional budget cutting and to present grounds that
would allow more sophisticated explanation of the variation in cutting behavior than the literature has been able to offer. In particular, the adequacy of
the agency's technology and the openendedness of its workload are proposed
as explanatory variables.
Previous work has shown sizable variations in the way agency requests are
reduced by Congress . Fenno's study of 36 agencies from 1947 to 1962 exhibited a range of 0% to 22% in the average cut made by the dominant House
Appropriations Committee . 2 Davis, Dempster , and Wildavsky, in studying
56 agencies from 1947 to 1963, noted variation from 0% to 16% in the average
cut made by Congress. 3 If one assumes that control over dollars is equivalent
to control of policy , this variation shows differential overt Congressional
involvement in one part of the policy process. Differential cutting implies that
Congress restrains some agencies from carrying out their desired programs
while allowing other agencies their head. It also suggests that the often
painted picture of executive dominance over Congress may be inaccurate. If
1 David Howard Davis, "The Price of Power : The Appropriations Process for Seventeen
For eign Affairs Agencies ," Public Policy, X:Vlll (Spring , 1970); "A Theory of the Budgetary
Process," APSR , LX (Sept ember , 1966) 529-547; Richard Fenno , The Power of the Purse:
Appropriations Politics in Congress, (Boston : Littl e, Brown, 1966); Stephen Hom , Unused
Power: The Work of the Senate Committ ee on Appropriation s, (Washington : The Brookings
Institution , 1970); Michael Kirst , Gooernm ent Without Passing Laws : Congress' Nonstatuatory
Techniqu es for Appropriations Control , (Chap el Hill , orth Carolina : Th e University of orth
Carolina Press , 1969); Ira Sharkansky , "Four Agencies and Appropriations Subcommittee: A
Comparativ e Study of Budget Strategies ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (1965),
254-281; Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budg etary Process, (Boston : Little , Brown, 1964).
Otto Davis, M.A.H. Dempst er, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process ,"
American Political Science Reoiew, LX (Sept ember , 1966) 529-547.
2 Fenno , p. 368.
3 Otto A. Davis, M.A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky , "On the Process of Budgeting:
An Empiri cal Study of Congr essional Appropriation ," pp . 102-113 in Gordon Tullock, ed ., Papers
on Non-Market Decision Making (Charlott esville, Virginia: Thomas Jefferson Center , 1966).
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Congress can thwart executive branch desires for expansion, it may not be as
impotent as the folklore suggests. Clearly, then, explaining why Congress cuts
as it does is of interest and importance.
What determines why Congress will cut one agency's budget request on
the average of2% and another's an average of 10%? Certainly the cut inflicted
on an agency's request can be a function of many variables. Temporary agency
visibility and topicality, Presidential-Congressional feuding, or national success (or scandal) in an agency's bailiwick all can cause or explain variation in
Congressional treatment of an agency's request. Although such relatively
idiosyncratic events can be important, they are not of much help in explaining
consistently severe or lenient cutting patterns. To explain such patterns
factors more permanent than topicality or political "bad blood" must be relied
upon. For this reason cutting behavior must be related to classes of agencies ,
characteristics of Congress, and sets of circumstances before law-like
generalizations can be made.
To explain Congressional budget behavior we must consider Congress'
value structure. Knowing what values Congress seeks to implement or optimize, and assuming these are consistent, theoretically allows one to predict
how Congress will act. While it is perhaps simplistic to assume that all
Congressional cutting behavior can be explained on the basis of one or a few
values, this paper proposes to see how far such an approach can go.
One value frequently ascribed to Congress is a drive for economy and
efficiency. Its unwillingness to raise taxes and its reluctance to increase
spending (unless there is strong constituency pressure) indicate a desire for
economy. The existence of standing Government Operations Committees in
both Houses whose work involves executive oversight signals an institutionalized Congressional drive for executive branch efficiency. Similarly ,
the pre-eminent Congressional agency, the General Accounting Office, symbolizes Congressional interest in economy and efficiency in the Federal
government. All of these facts lend support to the reasonableness of using
economy and efficiency as a base value in our characterization of Congress.
The budgeting literature corroborates this point of view. Richard Fenno
feels that the House has an economizing , efficiency and business-like orientation. 4 Stephen Horn argues that although the Senate has a similar outlook , it
holds it less tenaciously than the House. 5 And David Howard Davis' study of
the budgetary experiences of foreign affairs agencies agrees with Fenno 's
conclusion about Congressional affection for business-like agency operation. 6
Unfortunately, neither Davis' nor Fenno's work presents strong evidence to
confirm their statements. Fenno himself admits the exploratory and tentative
nature of his generalizations about types of agencies and committee treatment. 7
4

5

6
7

Fenno , p . 30, pp . 124-126, 315-320.
Hom , pp. 82-88.
David Howard Davis, "The Price of Power."
Fenno , pp. 411-413.
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If Congress as a whole, and most particularly its appropriations committees, has an efficiency and economy orientation, how would this influence
budget cutting behavior? It logically follows that requests coming from agencies that function efficiently would be leniently viewed by Congress. Similarly, if an agency does not have an efficient operation or appears to spend an
inordinate amount of money, Congress would act by severely reducing the
budget request.
More specifically, what does Congress look for in order to decide whether
an agency acts in accord with an efficiency orientation? We present two
characteristics now, each of which follows from the efficiency orientation
imputed to Congress. Later in the paper we present material to illustrate that
these characteristics have some grounding in reality, i.e., that the agencies
and Congress are aware of and think, at least occasionally, in terms of these
characteristics.
One agency characteristic Congress favors was noted by Fenno. He maintains that an agency with a well-defined workload is treated better by the
House Appropriations Committee than one with an open-ended workload or
task. 8 Where there is a well-defined task for the agency, such as processing
income tax returns, there is less likelihood of waste than in an activity like
furthering intergovernmental relations. Where the agency workload can be
easily identified and perhaps even quantified , Congress can determine if the
money requested is justified. The agency, knowing that such analysis is
possible, will more likely than not submit an "honest" budget with little
padding. Congress therefore would have little cutting discretion and will
reduce the request by only a small amount. The demand for economy therefore makes agency workload a point worth considering.
The efficiency orientation of Congress means that attention will be paid to
how well the job is being done. Thompson and Bates would concur with the
statement that technology is an important variable in Congressional executive
interaction because they feel that in general the kind of technology utilized by
an organization has important implications for the relation between the organization and its environment. 9 In the case of government agencies this is
particularly important. Norton Long and Matthew Holden, for instance , both
arg ue that power is crucial to administrative agencies . 10 Since an agency's
power is based on its constituencies, 11 what the agency can deliver should be
central to the agency-legislative nexus , because the ability to "deliver" means
that agency clients will not complain to a Congress that can punish an agency
by mangling its budget request s. Consequently Congressional assessment of
• Ibid ., pp . 370-377 .
9
James D . Thompson and Fr eder ick L. Bates, "Tec hnology, Organ izatio n , and Adminis tration ," Administrative Science Quarterly , II (Dece mbe r, 1957) 325-43.
10
Mort on Long, "Power and Admini stration ," Public Administration Review, IX (Autumn ,
1949), 257-264 and Matth ew Hold en, Jr ., " 'Imp erialism ' in Bur eaucracy," American Political
Science Review, LX (1966) 943-51.
11
H olden, p . 944.
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the adeq~acy of the agency's technology should be related to variations in
cutting behavior.
Certainly the kind of managerial skills possessed by agency administrators
will have an impact on the agency's ability to perform. But this impact would
be to dull or sharpen the basic technological capabilities of the agency. Some
bureaus simply cannot fully carry out their mandate because they lack the
necessary tools. For example , there is a major difference between the ability
of the Public llealth Service to stop or even retard the transmission of
venereal disease and the ability of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to
make perfect dollar bills. No matter how zealous the agents of the communicable disease center or how diligent the administrators of the Public Health
Service , they will be unable to stop the spread of syphilis, while with comparatively little effort , near perfect currency is produced in the Treasury Department . The technologies utilized by the two agencies make the crucial difference.
As will be illustrated below, Congress is aware of the differences in the
technologies used by various agencies. The economy and efficiency orientation of Congress suggests that that body would be more lenient toward an
agency that has a technology adequate to its mandated task than it would be
toward one whose technology is inadequate.
To summarize and formalize our hypotheses about budget cutting ,
Hypothesis 1: Budget requests for activities having a fixed workload will
be cut less, on the average, than requests for activities with
an open-ended workload.
Hypothesis 2: Budget requests for activities utilizing a technology
adequate to their mandated goals will be cut less , on the
average, than requests for activities whose technologies
are not adequate to their goals .

METHODOLOGY
In what way would Congressional "leniency" or "severity" be shown? How
will the budget cut be operationalized? To answer those questions we build on
the work of Davis , Dempster, and Wildavsky. Their research , alluded to
earlier, showed that the basic relation between Congress and the agencies was
of the form:
APPROPRIATION = /3 · REQUEST
Their analysis of all 116 non-defense agencies showed that the relation expressed by the equation above was the best approximation to reality in 68
cases. The remaining 48 agencies' budget relations were minor modifications
of the above equation. 12
12
Otto A. Davis, M .A.H . Dempster , and Aaron Wildavsky , "On the Process of Budgeting
ll: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations ," pp. 292-375 in R. F . Byrne, A Charnes
W . W . Cooper , 0. A. Davis, and Dorothy Gilford , eds. , Studi es in Budgeting (Amsterdam and
New York: North-Holland Publishing Company , 1971), p. 307.
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If A is the appropriation and R the request, then C, the cut, would be
R - A. Therefore,
the equation, A = {3 · R, could be rewritten as
C = (1 - /3) · R, which says that the cut is proportional to the request in raw
dollars. Since Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's data and Fenno's work
showed that Congress almost invariably cuts from the request, our basic
cutting relation would be CUT= a· REQUEST, where O ~a< 1. We
seek to explain why the "a's" differ from agency to agency.
This research is not completely parallel to that of Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky. Our model is analogous to their basic model, the one that
"explained" best for 68 of their 116 agencies. We use this si!fiple model of the
cutting relation because our purpose is to explain variation in cutting from
agency to agency; this requires that the cutting models be the same for all
agencies. Secondly, the models reflecting "reality" best in 48 of the 116
agencies were minor modifications of the basic model. Therefore any error of
misrepresentation would be only minimal.
It is tempting to use the variables as defined by Davis, Dempster and
Wildavsky to investigate differential cutting behavior but we do not do so. The
reason for transforming the variables above was to focus on the amount cut,
rather than the total amount appropriated. That was done because the cut
reflects the increment Congress removed, and it is increments that Congress
examines. By using the total amount requested and the total amount appropriated, Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's formulation does not "represent
behavioral rules," 13 as they purport to. Their basic problem lies in the
inability of their model to reflect incrementalism as the budgetary actors see
it.
All of the behavioral budgeting literature stresses the incremental nature
of the budget process, so much so that criticisms of budgeting practice often
center about its incrementalism. Demands for an overall appraisal of total
requests are heard from reformers disturbed by the presentation and consideration of only the increments over last year's budget. These demands, in fact,
were instrumental in the creation of the PPB system. Wildavsky' s The Politics
of the Budgetary Process and the works of other scholars present the concept
of the agency's budget base, usually its last appropriation, which is considered
by both Congress and the agency to be sacrosanct.
That the base (for our purposes, last year's appropriation) is not considered
to be fair game by the budgetary actors is manifested in many ways. Consider
that the budget justification materials given to Congress spell out in many
places the increases requested over last year's base and the purposes to which
the increases are to be put. Questioning in the hearings focuses on the
requested increases. The prose portion of Congressional appropriations reports almost always concentrates on the reasons for allowing or disallowing the
increments requested. The tabular summaries of committee action in the
13

Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1971, pp. 292, 295-97.
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reports always have a column showing the amount cut by the committee. And
the annual Senate Document titledAppropriations, Estimates, Etc., which is
a compilation of all data related to appropriations, also tabulates the cut the
Congress as a whole took from the agency requests. All of this points to the fact
that Congress specifically attends to the increments and not the total amount
requested.
Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky's formulation of the relations obtaining
between Congress and the agencies unfortunately implies that budget evaluation is zero-based because their variables are the total request and total
appropriation. Although they consider their equations to "represent behavioral rules," given the points just considered, their equations do not. If we
are interested in explanation of phenomenon, congruence between the model
and the behavior to be explained is very desirable. Therefore, to be accurate in
specifying the relationship between request and cut, we must examine only
what Congress attends to: the increments. Hence the following variables will
be used:
REQ = this year's request - last year's appropriation
CUT = amount Congress disallows of the REQ
The general model then says that
CUT= a· REQ
To test our hypotheses we must compare the "a's" for the equation estimated
from fllCedand open-ended workload data and from adequate and inadequate
technology data. Evaluation of the "a's" is by regression analysis. Using
ordinary least squares we estimate the following equations:
adequate technology activities
CUT = /31 · REQ
inadequate technology activities
CUT = /32 · REQ

open-ended activities
CUT= a1 · REQ
fixed task activities
CUT = a2 · REQ

Hypothesis 1 predicts that a2 < a1 while
hypothesis 2 predicts that /31 < /32.

DATA
Data for this study consist of the appropriations requests of 9 agencies (as
approved by the Bureau of the Budget) and their appropriations for the period
FY 1952-66 and for 3 agencies for a slightly shorter period. These 12 agencies
were chosen according to three criteria: 1) variation in size, running from less
than 100 to over 5000 employees, with a corresponding range in budgets; 2)
simple funding structure; i.e., almost all money is received in annual appropriations and not in trust funds, revolving funds, or permanent appropriations
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TABLE 1
Agency and Activity

Technology
Adequate

Bureau of Labor Standards
Record keeping on union registration
and pension plans
Promoting safety and worker benefits
Bureau of Public Debt
Securities and bonds processing
Selling savings bonds
Commodity Exchange Authority
Restraining commodity market
manipulation
Food and Drug Administration
Regulation of food and drug
manufacturing
Research on effects of drugs ,
additives, etc.
Narcotics Bureau
Prevention of drug traffic
Office of Business Economics
Analysis of economy , compute GNP
Office of Saline Water
Water desalinization research
Office of the Treasurer
Pay and service government checks
Patent Office
Process patent applications
Wage and Hour Division
Enforcing minimum wage laws
Study effects of minimum wage
increase, etc .
Weather Bureau
Provision of weather reports
Meteorological research
Women 's Bureau
Promotion of Women's status

Inadequate

Workload
OpenFixed
Ended

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

that would unduly constrain cutting; 3) all of the agency's activities had to be
either" service," regulatory, research, or promotional in nature, or a com bination of them. These activities were chosen because they represent much of the
activity the federal government engages in and because by choosing a number
of activities we would maximize the variation in the nature of agency operation. Seven of the agencies carried out only one activity, while five engaged in
two. Table 1 details the agencies and their activities. Since our theory says that
the agency's activity is what Congress reacts to, the total agency request and
cut are not the units of analysis, but the request and cut for the activity are.
Numerical data were gathered from the budget documents. Also, over
90% of the House Appropriations hearings for the 12 agencies involved for the
period from FY 1954 to 1968 were read. The hearings are the regular scene of
formal interaction between Congress and the agencies, wherein there is
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detailed presentation of agency operation and Congressional inquiry into that
operation . The hearings also yield information about the adequacy of the
agency's technology and the open-endedness of its workload . To illustrate the
kind of evidence that is available in the hearings , to show that the variables
used reflect real aspects of budget behavior , and to give some examples ofhow
the agency data were coded , the following data drawn from the hearings are
presented.
The inadequate technology of the Narcotics Bureau , for instance , was
expressed quite openly by its Director, Dr. Anslinger , in the hearings for FY
1956 when he said of traffic in drugs ,
But to stop th e source of supply, you could use the Army , the Navy , and
the Marines and you could not stop it . We might seize 10 percent , but we
could never do better than that. 14
Similarly , when William Neal , National Director of the Savings Bond Division
of the Bureau of Public Debt was asked what the yield would be in sales of
savings bonds if the sales staff activities were increased , he replied
I would not say that if you doubled our field staff that we would double our
sales. Somewhere you reach a point of diminishing retums. 15
Not only is technological inadequacy noted by the agency executives, but
such knowledge is also possessed by higher administration officals. For instance , Secretary of Labor Mitchell during the hearings for FY 1959 in
speaking about increasing the size of the Wage and Hour Division 's staff
echoed the words cited above when he testified ,
There is a point of diminishing returns here . You can put on hundreds of
more investigators and probably find more violations . It is a question of
whether or not that is an economical thing to do . 16
Contrariwise, when an agency 's technology is adequate this is often noted.
Representative Gary in the FY 1964 hearings praised the operation of the
Bureau of Public Debt by saying to its Director,
Mr. Merritt, this committee has always taken pride in the work of the
Bureau of Public Debt and the way it has conducted a very efficient and
economical operation. I am glad to see you are continuing in the tradition.17
The research done by the Office of Saline Water was so successful that by 1958
it had cut the cost of water desalinization to half of what it was when the
research began ;18 and , by 1962 the cost in some areas was down to about one
14
Hous e Appropriations Committe e, "Treasury Departm e nt Appropriations Hearings for
FY 1966," p. 270.
15 Ibid ., p . 201.
16
"Labor Departm ent Appropriations Hearings for FY 1959," p. 20.
17
"Treasury Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1964," p . 318.
18 "Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1959," p . 59.
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quarter the original cost. 19 The hearings are replete with statements in favor of
the agency. A typical supportive comment comes from Representative Jensen,
Just how long it will take before we can take water out of the ocean,
especially for the use of irrigation , is another thing ; but I have great
confidence that in a few years we are going to be able to desalt water
cheap enough to use it for municipal purposes. 20
As Fenno's study has illustrated, Congress is aware of the distinction
between agency controllable and uncontrollable activities . In this sample the
same holds true. For example, Rep. Winfield Denton, speaking about a
request to follow up a project complained,
Of course , the trouble I have seen since I have been on this committee and I have been on this committee a comparatively short time - is this:
we grant money for a temporary project, and then we find there is
nothing more permanent than a temporary project. They never get
through with it. 21
The agencies also recognize that some operations are open-ended and subject
to agency control. Speaking of the research activities carried out by the
Weather Bureau, Dr. Reichelderfer, its director , admitted that ,
Well, in research, of course, there is no limit to the funds that might be
put into projects ....
That is, research is a progressive thing. Perhaps we will learn enough this
year so we will need more next year. 22
The hearings also give ample evidence of agency and Congressional
awareness of fixed workloads. The Bureau of Public Debt Director , Merritt,
noted that fixed nature of his workload.
The volume of work to be performed under this activity stems primarily
from the sale and redemption of savings bonds. The workload base cannot
be controlled by the Bureau of Public Debt but is dependent on the sales,
service and redemption functions the Bureau is called upon to perform. 23
Similarly, Robert G. Watson, the Commissioner of Patents , said of his organization,
It is well for me to emphasize that the work which the Patent Office is
called upon to accomplish does not expand and contract at the option of
those who are charged with the duty of preparing and presenting its

19

20
21
22
23

"Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1964," p. 1264.
"Interior Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1957," p . 20.
"Labor Department Appropriatfons Hearings for FY 1958," pp. 98-99.
"Commerce Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1955," p . 427.
"Treasury Department Appropriations Hearings for FY 1954," p. 147.
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budget. The amount of work to be done is governed almost entirely by
public demand. 24
The agencies' activities were coded as being either adequate or inadequate
in technology and as having an open-ended workload or one fixed outside the
organization. The coding is shown in Table 1.
For completeness' sake the rationale for each coding is briefly detailed
now. Because they are basically paper handling and record keeping operations, the securities and bond processing of the Bureau of Public Debt, the
union registration and pension plan filing activities of the Bureau of Labor
Standards, the check paying and servicing operation of the Treasurer 's Office,
Patent searches, and weather data collection and analysis were coded as
having adequate technology for their tasks. There is no basic difficulty in
processing routine data.
The remaining activities coded as having adequate technology were all
involved in some research that bore fruit. As mentioned above the Office of
Saline Water was successful in its endeavors, the FDA research can identify
toxic and dangerous drugs, the Office of Business Economics can investigate
the state of the economy and compute the GNP, the Wage and Hour Division
was able to evaluate the effects of the increase in minimum wage, and the
Weather Bureau was, through weather-satellite research , able to predict the
weather better.
Contrariwise, the bond selling activities of the Bureau of Public Debt,
promotion of worker safety by the Bureau of Labor Standards, and the efforts
of the Womens Bureau to advance the status of women were coded as
inadequate in technology. These and the regulatory activities of the FDA, the
Commodity Exchange Authority, the Wage and Hour Division , and the
arcotics Bureau all attempt to modify human behavior, a rather refractory
material to work on as some of the quotations above indicated.
The paper handling and record management activities of the Patent Office,
the Bureau of Labor Standards, the Bureau of Public Debt, the Office of the
Treasurer, and the Weather Bureau were coded as having a fixed workload
since they cannot expand their activities easily , being bound to process an
input beyond their control. The regulatory activities were also considered to
have a fixed workload, because there are only so many drug pushers, market
manipulators, wage cheaters, or pharmaceutical producers to be restrained.
Granted, these limits may be high and in fact unreachable. But, as the
quotations above indicated, Congress recognizes the practically unattainable
workloads and , speaking of "points of diminishing returns," can be conceived
of as regarding the workload as fixed. In any case , the workload is beyond the
regulators' control.

24

"Commerce

Department

Appropriations Hearings for FY 1954," p. 313.
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Promoting the sale of savings bonds, seeking to advance the place of
women, and attempting to ameliorate the conditions of worker safety were
considered to have an open ended workload because the activities or projects
in those areas are determined by the initiative of the bureaucracy and not
primarily by demands or inputs from the environment. The remarks of the
Weather Bw-eau director about the expansiveness of research activities in his
bureau characterizes the open-ended nature of work in all research agencies.
Since the work is not input from the outside but is internally generated,
mostly by professionals within the organization , its expandability is clear.

FI DI GS
The regressions estimated from the data are displayed in Table 2. These
results substantiate hypothesis 1. Requests from agencies engaged in fixed
workload activities are cut 39% on the average, while the average cut from
requests for open ended activities is 52%. Both of these "cutting percentages"
are significantly different from zero, and the small size of the standard errors of
the coefficients means that it is highly unlikely that the difference between the
cutting percentages is due to chance.
The relationship between the cutting percentages of the adequate and
inadequate activity requests is completely contrary to our expectations. The
regressions show the adequate technology activity requests are cut 48% while
requests for activities that have inadequate technology are cut only 34%.
Congress, apparently is more lenient to requests from agencies that cannot
really "deliver the goods." In tl1is case again the coefficients are significantly
different from zero and tl1e standard errors of the coefficients are so small that
it is very unlikely that the inadequate technology cutting percentage actually
exceeds tlrnt for adequate technology activities.
TABLE 2
Cutting Behavior Equations
Open-ended activities
CUT = .5189 REQ
SE = .036

r

Fixed task activities
CUT
SE

r = .614

= .3938
= .040

REQ

= .827

Adequate technology activities
CUT = .4807 REQ
SE = .047

r

= .644

Inadequate technology activities
CUT = .3378 REQ
SE = .026

r

= .776
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Both hypotheses were based on the assumption that Congressional decision rules in th e appropriations proc ess were guided primarily by an economy
and efficiency orientation. Th e results displayed in Tabl e 2, howev er , indicat e
that while Congr ess does treat various classes of bureaucratic operation differently, th e basis of that difference is not universally an economy and efficiency
orientation. Th e actual agency output at times takes second plac e to more
symbolic products . Congr ess apparently is slow to cut a lot from promotional
and regulatory activities. Who , it might be argued, is against furth er pros ecution of narcotics p eddl ers and market manipulators , and who can object to
selling savings bonds or promoting th e status of women? Certainly not Congress . Though it may give lip service to efficiency, in some instances the
illusion of output and the image that th e government is "fighting the good
fight" is more important than saving money that cannot promis e a sure return .
This res earch suggests that symbolic considerations ent er into the pictur e. 25
On e of th e original motivations in the study was to identify characteristics
of agencies that would explain variation in how Congr ess reduc ed the requests
of various agencies. To determin e Congressional behavior th e data bas e used
was the requests and cuts from 12 agencies all togetl1er . This established that
Congress did cut agencies differ entially on the basis of th e technology and
workload characteristics of the request being considered. The real test of the
explanation offered would be whether it allows explaining th e variation in th e
"cutting percentag es" among agencies. Table 3 displays the "cutting percentages " tl1at characterized each individual agency or agency activity in the data
set.

25 Up until now the cutting behavior has been ascribed to "Cong ress." Most appropri ations
decisions are made , however, by the appropriations subcommittees. It is possible, th erefo re, that
variatio n in cuttin g behavior might depe nd on th e particular Senate and House Appropriations
subcommittees that in fact make the bud get decisions. To explore this possibility, th e hypotheses
were tested, where data allowed, for each set of Hou se and Senate subcommitt ees that were
involved . The result s were basically the same within subcommittees as we have found across
subcommittees.
It was possible to test the workload hypotheses within thr ee subcommi ttees: the Commerce,
State and Justice subcommittees , the Labor and HEW subcommit tees, and the Treasur y subcommitt ees. The hypotheses relating to technology could only be tested on the Labor-HEW and
th e Treas ur y subcommi ttees, as the requests before the Co mmerce subcommittees wer e all
adeq uate technology req uests.
In all the subcomm ittees both of the hypotheses were corrobora ted in that the re lative size of
the regress ion coefficients were in accordance with that predicted. While there were some
differenc es in th e cutting percentages from one set of House and Senate appropriations subcommittees to another, within each set of subcomm ittees the same mechanisms attribut ed to
Congress as a whole still operated.
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TABLE 3
REQ on Agency Activities

=a

Ci

SE of a

r

. 7730
.5284
.3907
.3869
.2264

. 139
.046
. 132
.299
.095

.786
.965
.781
.042
.619

Inadequat e technology and open-ended workload
Bureau of Public Debt .... . .................
, . . . .. . . . . . . .7187
Bur eau of Labor Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3952
Women's Burea u .... . . . ... . ... . . . . ... .................
. -. 2285

. 133
.134
.234

.825
.429
.177

Inadequat e technology and fvced workload
Food and Drug Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wage and H our Division . .... . . . ... . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commodity Exchang e Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Narcotics Bur eau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.3522
.2208
. 1105
.0629

.058
. 107
.236
. 101

.751
.545
.450
.464

Adequat e technology and open-ended workload
Office of Business Economic s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weather Bur eau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Office of Saline Wat er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Food and Drug Admini str ation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wage and Hour Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 6097
.6043
.4941
.4309
.3620

. 118
. 126
.079
. 155
.131

.762
.844
.867
.897
.507

Age ncy-activity
A dequat e techn ology and fi xed workload
Bureau of Publi c Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bureau of Labor Standard s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pat ent Office...........
... ... ... ... .... ... ... .. .. . ... ..
Office of th e Tr easur er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weath er Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The correlation coefficients for the agency activities are , with two exceptions , reasonably high. This indicates that the model is relatively congruent
with reality and that the blanket application of th e basic cutting model did not
cause any major problems. Although the correlations here are not as good as
those in the Davis, Dempster , and Wildavsky research , given that we are
dealing with first differences , the correlations ar~ sufficiently high .
The power of the technology and workload variables can be tested by
comparing the "cutting percentages ." We split the "cutting percentages" into
high cuts (those greater than or equal to the median cutting percentage ) and
low cuts (those less than the median cutting percentage ). The cross tabulations
are shown in Figure I.
FIGURE 1

cutting
percentag e

Technology
Adequate
Inadequate

Workload
Open
Fixed

;;.: median

7

2

3

6

< median

3

5

6

2

x 2 = 1.417
p < .20

x 2 = 1.s16
p < .20
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Since the significance level is only. 20 we cannot hold that the variables are
separately very sb·ong in explaining why the cutting percentage of one agency
exceeds that of another, although they do have some influence in the predicted direction.
If , however , the combined force of the two variables are brought to bear ,
we see some stronger explanation. The results from the regression equations
predict that the most leniently treated activities have an inadequate technology and a fixed workload; in our sample these are the regulatory activities.
Conversely the most harshly treated activities have an adequate technology
and an open ended workload, which are the research activities in the sample.
If the two variables working together are powerful we would expect the
cutting percentages of the research activities to exceed those of the regulatory
activities. As Table 3 indicates, this is indeed the case. Hence we conclude
that the technology and workload variables allow some explanation of the
differential cutting behavior of Congress.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The research was undertaken to investigate variation in cutting behavior
by Congress. It treated requests for activities with a fixed workload more
leniently than it did those with open ended workloads; this was in concordance
with the belief that Congress operated with an economizing value structure.
Contrary to expectations, however, Congress treated requests for activities
involving an adequate technology more severely than it did those with an
inadequate technology. This second pattern was not consistent with a purely
economizing model of Congressional behavior . More symbolic or at least
nonefficiency values thus seem to characterize some Congressional behavior
in the budgeting arena.
An attempt was made to explain the variation in cutting behavior experienced by the agencies in the sample by using the regularities determined
above. There was only limited success in explaining the severity of cutting by
utilizing the two variables by themselves. Together, however, they fully
explained the higher cutting percentage of one group of agency activity over
the cutting percentage of an "opposite" group of agencies.
Although the sample was not random , the results do indicate that the
technology and the openendedness of agency activity are tools that explain
why Congress treats agencies differentially in the budgeting arena . It certainly indicates that it is possible to explain variation in Congressional budgeting behavior in terms of agency character and points to the probable fruitfulness of further research in this area.

